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Abstract This chapter briefly examines the political implications of COVID-19, focus-
ing on the potential constraints and opportunities it poses for populism. Some initial 
comparative observations suggest the following patterns. First, populists in opposition 
are likely to be weakened electorally in the short-run, as voters support non-populists on 
the basis of valence voting. Second, this may not apply to populists in power, who may 
use emergency measures for democratic backsliding. Third, in the long-run, a potential 
economic crisis as a result of the pandemic may benefit populist parties, especially those 
in opposition as discontent voters may punish those in government for the poor manag-
ing of the health/economy trade-off. In sum, what will determine the direction of future 
political developments is the extent to which governments can balance the trade-offs 
involved in the COVID-19 crisis, including effective health management versus economic 
growth and individual freedoms versus collective security.
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1 Introduction
The exponential spread of COVID-19 in early 2020 placed governments around 
the world under severe strain. Despite the global reach of the virus, nation-
states responded primarily as individual actors, seeking to contain the vi-
rus and ensure the resilience of their national health systems. Part of this 
response was the closure of borders and the grounding of airlines confirm-
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ing that, although a global phenomenon, COVID-19 required first and 
foremost a national response. Besides the health dimension, this is 
also interesting from a political perspective as COVID-19 emerged 
at a time when the retreat of the nation-state and the restoration of 
sovereignty were relevant political trends: for example Brexit and 
the rise of right-wing populist parties that pledge to restrict immi-
gration and challenge EU expansion. How may we assess the politi-
cal implications of this global crisis, especially given that it comes at 
a time when populists, who thrive on the tensions between interna-
tional initiatives and the ‘national preference’, are either in charge, 
or the main opposition party, in many countries? 
This chapter briefly examines the political implications of 
COVID-19, focusing on the potential constraints and opportunities it 
poses for populism. This is a new and fluid situation that is fast evolv-
ing. While data is novel and relatively untested, we may still draw 
some (cautious) preliminary conclusions by comparing cases in an 
attempt to identify broad patterns and exceptions. What follows is 
a brief sketch of patterns from which we may identify certain poli-
cy implications and lessons learned. The chapter first outlines a se-
ries of trade-offs with regard to the COVID-19 situation. It then pro-
ceeds to examine the political implications of these trade-offs, before 
briefly discussing the challenges and opportunities they represent 
for populist actors. Distinguishing between populists in opposition 
and populists in power, it concludes with lessons learned and ave-
nues for future research. 
2 COVID-19 Trade-offs
According to the 2019 Global Health Security (GHS) Index, fewer 
than 5% of countries included in the index scored highly, suggest-
ing that the majority of countries were poorly prepared to respond 
to, and mitigate the effect of, a pandemic. The emergence of COV-
ID-19 confirmed this overall lack of preparedness, but also revealed 
a paradox: on the one hand, some of the world’s most stable democ-
racies that scored highly in the GHS, such as the UK and the US, 
performed particularly poorly. On the other hand, developing au-
thoritarian countries, such as Vietnam, and smaller democracies fa-
tigued by economic and political upheaval in recent years, such as 
Greece, outperformed advanced Western democracies in the han-
dling of the pandemic. 
In order to explain this variation, preliminary research on this 
topic has examined short-term indicators such as the speed with 
which distancing measures were introduced, quarantine effective-
ness and willingness to comply (see e.g. Brouard, Vasilopoulos, Be-
cher 2020; Hale et al. 2020; Fenner 2020). This research suggests 
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that along with long-term infrastructural capacity, short-term polit-
ical decisions have played a very important role in the containment 
and mitigation of COVID-19. Responding early is key to responding 
effectively, so for example tracking, testing and containing infection 
clusters is of paramount importance. Countries that introduced lock-
down measures early tended to have better results, again Greece be-
ing a prime example, though some preliminary work has noted incon-
sistencies with this broad pattern (see Born et al 2020 on Sweden). 
This reality highlighted that addressing the pandemic is all about 
trade-offs and presented both governments and citizens with some 
important dilemmas: does effective health management occur at the 
expense of economic growth? Should we introduce – and adhere – to 
strict lockdown measures at the expense of our personal liberties? 
Should we trade-off these individual liberties for our collective secu-
rity? These trade-offs, in turn, have important political implications 
given the delicate political climate – rise of populism, euroscepticism, 
Brexit – at the time of the emergence of COVID-19. 
3 What Now for Populism?
Far right populist parties, which utilise a rhetoric that combines na-
tionalism and the ‘Popular Will’, have significantly increased their 
electoral performance since the 2010s. Examples abound: the French 
Front National (FN) (now Rassemblement National), the Dutch Free-
dom Party (PVV), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FPÖ), the Nor-
wegian Progress Party (FrP) and the German Alternative for Ger-
many (AfD) have all mobilised voters on their populist-nationalist 
platforms. Their electoral success has been the focus of a substantial 
body of literature in the fields of party politics and voting behaviour 
(see Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; Stockemer, Lentz, Mayer 2018). 
Different explanations place varying emphasis on factors including 
immigration and cultural insecurity (Inglehart, Norris 2016), eco-
nomic deprivation, both actual and relative (Colantone 2018; Fetzer 
2019; Adler, Ansell 2019; Engler, Weisstanner 2020; Halikiopou-
lou, Vlandas 2020), societal decline and status anxiety (Gest 2016; 
Gidron, Hall 2019) as well as institutional mistrust and poor evalu-
ations of governance quality (Hooghe, Marien, Pauwels 2011; Ager-
berg 2017). While scholars disagree about the source of the griev-
ance that prompts voters to opt for far right populism, at the core of 
the debate is the impact of globalisation (Kriesi et al 2006) that di-
vides societies between winners and losers, thus incentivizing the 
discontent to vote for parties that place blame on the establishment. 
Populism posits that only decisions made from below are legiti-
mate – and indeed morally superior (Riker 1982), because only these 
decisions reflect the will of the people (Mudde 2004). As such, pop-
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ulists tend to be sceptical of intermediary institutions, elites and 
experts, who they try to discredit. They thrive on an emotive but 
often empty rhetoric, aimed at voters motivated by the need to pro-
test their social, economic and/or cultural discontent. Far right pop-
ulism merges this narrative with nationalism. These parties pledge 
to speak on behalf of the ‘pure people’, restore national sovereign-
ty, ‘take back control’ from supranational institutions and promote 
the ‘national preference’ through strict immigration and citizenship 
policies (Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2019). This suggests competing ex-
pectations regarding the electoral fortunes of far right populist par-
ties in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the limits 
placed on globalisation by the pandemic could reduce the attrac-
tions of populists. In addition, the need to manage the pandemic re-
quires effective government, expertise and efficient democratic in-
stitutions providing the organisational and infrastructural support 
that determines state effectiveness. In this respect, COVID-19 could 
pose a significant challenge to populists by exposing their lack of 
competence, and placing them under scrutiny. In accordance to the 
valence model of voting (Evans, Chzhen 2016), which suggests that 
party performance evaluations affect voter choices, voters may in-
creasingly prioritise competence over emotive narratives. Populist 
parties in opposition may become weakened electorally as non-pop-
ulists in power have tended to consolidate their support during the 
pandemic (Bayerlin, Gyongyosi 2020). 
On the other hand, potential ‘austerity’ strategies resulting from 
the health crisis could exacerbate those voters’ insecurities that 
prompt them to support far right populist parties. In addition, pop-
ulists in power could benefit from the crisis by blaming immigrants 
and refugees for the spread of the pandemic, using them as an oppor-
tunity for power abuse and an excuse to attack freedom of movement. 
Indeed far right populism is compatible with some of the COVID-19 
blame-patterns: closure of borders, exclusion of immigrants and an 
emphasis on restricting health services for natives. In a number of 
cases this has helped populists – or rather right-wing nationalist au-
thoritarians – in power to use the COVID-19 crisis to extend their 
powers in the political system. Autocratic-minded leaders, for exam-
ple Orban in Hugary, Modi in India and Bolsonaro in Brazil, have ral-
lied around the flag to increase support at a time of heightened inse-
curity. One important lesson from the past is that, in similar crisis 
situations, authoritarian and/or nationalist leaders have taken ad-
vantage of emergencies to consolidate power (Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018). 
This suggests that there is a substantial danger of further democrat-
ic backsliding by suspending democratic institutions through emer-
gency laws, for example suspending parliament and ruling by decree. 
This raises questions about the utility of the term populism to de-
scribe the challenges to democratic politics both prior to, and after 
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the emergence of COVID-19. One of the most concerning political 
developments regarding actors described as ‘populist’ is not actu-
ally their populism – referred to above as an ideology that draws on 
a distinction between the good people and the bad elites (Mudde 
2004) – but rather their nationalist, authoritarian and/or a far right 
agenda. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the extent to 
which the term ‘populism’ itself is inflated, overused and too broad 
to be analytically useful. Conflating the terms nationalism, right-
wing extremism or authoritarianism, i.e. grouping any party that has 
these attributes in the populist category because of these attributes, 
means that populism is superfluous and what really matters is the 
other attribute: nationalist, far right, or authoritarian for example 
(Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2019). Orban was able to impose undemo-
cratic measures in Hungary not because he is a populist but because 
he is authoritarian. Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini blame immi-
grants for the pandemic not because they are populists, but because 
they are nationalists.
The long-term political consequences of this are significant. In 
cases where democratic institutions are weak there is a serious risk 
of further democratic backsliding. The long-term economic costs of 
the pandemic can only serve to exacerbate this. As a large body of 
literature suggests, wealth inequalities, decline of social status, and 
limited access to compensation can serve to drive voters closer to 
extremism (Adler, Ansell 2019; Gidron, Hall 2019; Halikiopoulou, 
Vlandas 2016). 
4 Conclusion
In sum, what will determine the direction of future political develop-
ments is the extent to which governments can balance the trade-offs 
involved and exit this crisis having simultaneously protected society’s 
most vulnerable and retained its democratic institutions and values. 
Future research can delve into these dynamics in greater detail. 
Comparative research across cases and across time can identify fur-
ther patterns with regard to which populist actors are more likely to 
be weakened and why. In the short term, health policies and strin-
gency measures will affect a government’s popularity. But longer 
term factors, such as state capacity and the strength and impartial-
ity of a country’s democratic institutions, will determine the extent 
to which democracy can withstand the COVID-19 shock. While the 
current pandemic may be unique in its specificities, it is not unprec-
edented in terms of what it represents: an emergency situation that 
exposes systemic weaknesses and threatens the stability of demo-
cratic societies. Lessons learned from parallel historical precedents 
may offer us the benefit of hindsight. 
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